Georgy Lvovich Smolyan is Chief Research Fellow at the Institute for Systems Analysis of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Doctor of Philosophy, and the author of more than 160 scholarly publications devoted to the problems of reflexive control, the human factor in the development of science and technology, and the information society.
This paper examines the forms and techniques of reflexive control, defined by V. A. Lefebvre as the exertion of influence on subjects so as to induce them to make decisions that have been predetermined by the controlling side.
The foundational ideas of reflexive control were formulated in the late 1960s within the context of managing an adversary in conflict situations and information warfare. They are illustrated here with examples drawn from the works of Soviet military experts of that period.
Methods of reflexive control—commonly referred to as “stratagems”—are also mentioned in the earliest Chinese treatise on the art of war. Particular attention is given to one of the most effective and widespread stratagems, namely the stratagem of provocation.
The concluding section of the article addresses the moral and ethical dimensions of reflexive control.
More than forty years ago, Vladimir Alexandrovich Lefebvre, in a brief and aphoristic form, expressed through the characters of a children’s tale the very essence of reflexive control: “Do whatever you want with me—just don’t throw me into the briar patch,” said Brother Rabbit to Brother Fox. It must be acknowledged that over the years the “Brother Rabbits” have advanced considerably, continually expanding and enriching the arsenal of their technologies.
Modern media and the Internet provide them with entirely new, unprecedented opportunities, having become a comfortable platform for the mass application of reflexive control and for the implementation of what Viktor Pelevin termed “internal technologies”: “…External technologies affect what we see, while internal ones affect what we think” [1, p. 83].
I have often been convinced that great writers successfully anticipate events and meanings. Here is how Viktor Pelevin describes the problem of choice: “The main problem is precisely to get rid of the freedom of choice, to firmly lead toward the required decision while preserving the certainty that the choice was free. In scientific terms this is called compulsory orientation” [3, p. 80]. This very situation—implicit compulsory orientation when a subject makes a decision—was what V. Lefebvre called reflexive control.
In his early works [2, 3], reflexive control was considered as managing an adversary’s decision-making in conflict situations and defined as follows: “The process of transferring the grounds for decision-making from one adversary to another we call reflexive control. Any deceptive maneuvers, provocations and intrigues, camouflage, hoaxes, the creation of false objects (and indeed lies in any context) represent implementations of reflexive control” [3, p. 36]. Any single technique, Pelevin continues, when applied on its own, can be easily detected. But if they are used in combination, shifting seamlessly from one to another, while the overall intensity remains at the threshold of perception, manipulation achieves virtually one hundred percent effectiveness while remaining completely imperceptible [1, p. 88].
Here the key word has been spoken—manipulation. Since ancient times, people have been and remain the object of manipulative influence. Manipulative effects on an individual’s perceptions and emotional-volitional sphere, as well as on individual, group, and mass consciousness, are instruments of psychological pressure with the aim of explicitly or implicitly compelling individual and social subjects to make decisions—and thus take actions—contrary to their own interests, in favor of those persons, groups, or organizations exercising such influence.
It should be noted that interest in studying the mechanisms of manipulative influence has remained stable for many decades. Two main contexts predominate. The first is psychological-psychiatric, represented by E. Shostrom (see, for example, Man, the Manipulator. Moscow, 2002) and Eric Berne, the author of the widely known popular science books Games People Play and People Who Play Games (Moscow, 2008). Both authors are rooted in psychotherapeutic practice and do not delve deeply into the mechanisms of manipulation. The second is political-ideological, marked by the Cold War and describing primarily its arsenal of information and propaganda (see, for example: Schiller, H. Mind Manipulators. Moscow, 1980). This author focuses attention on the technologies of “brainwashing,” which is essentially the domain of mass media.
In the very meaning of the term manipulation lies a negative, provocative connotation. Certain forms of manipulative influence (whether crude propaganda or sophisticated PR campaigns), aimed at the population as a whole or targeted at specific individuals, social strata and groups, political parties and movements, are capable of seriously disrupting the normal functioning and vital activity of social institutions, state structures, public organizations, civic associations, and individuals.
Such influences must be classified as negative, since they generate psycho-emotional and socio-psychological tension, distort moral criteria and norms, lead to moral-political disorientation, and, as a result, provoke inadequate behavior among individuals, groups, and masses. Summed up, this may result in severe consequences— deep transformations of individual, group, and mass consciousness, changes in the moral-political and socio-psychological climate of society.
Manipulative influences constitute the core of reflexive control. If in 1967 V. A. Lefebvre placed this core in the context of decision-making in conflict, today reflexive control has acquired a broad political and socio-cultural meaning. Lefebvre characterizes it as follows in his most recent book [4, p. 9]: “Reflexive control is an informational influence on objects that can only be described using such concepts as consciousness and will. Such objects include individual people and human associations: the family, the group, the stratum, the nation, society, civilization. The term ‘reflexive control’ may be understood in two senses. First, as the art of manipulating people and human associations. Second, as a specific method of social control.”
Reflexive control is thus an influence exerted upon subjects that inclines them to adopt decisions prearranged by the controlling side. The author distinguishes four types of reflexive control:
Manipulation through direct influence;
Manipulation through altering relationships (between individuals in a group);
Manipulation through changing the order of significance;
Influence upon the unconscious sphere of subjects [4, p. 89].
In the military field, among the first experts to adopt the ideas and terminology of V. A. Lefebvre were S. Leonenko and M. D. Ionov.
The former wrote: “Reflexive control occurs when the command body transmits to the controlled system the incentives and grounds that will serve as the basis for achieving a desirable decision [5]; its essence is kept in strict secrecy. Reflection induces certain processes of simulating the enemy’s reasoning or possible behavior, compelling him to make a decision unfavorable to himself. In fact, the adversary arrives at a decision based on his perception of the situation, which includes the disposition of the opposing side’s units and facilities, as well as the intentions of active elements known to him. The initial ideas for decision-making are formed primarily on the basis of intelligence and other data and factors, which rely on a stable set of concepts, knowledge, ideas, and, finally, experience” [5, p. 28].
“Reflexive control,” the expert continued, “exploits moral, psychological, and other factors, as well as the personal characteristics of commanders. In the latter case, biographical data, habits, and psychological differences could be used in deceptive actions [5, pp. 29–30]. In a war where reflexive control is employed, the side with the highest quality of ‘reflection’ (that is, greater ability to simulate the thoughts of the other side or predict its behavior) will have the best chances of victory. The quality of ‘reflection’ depends on many factors, the most important of which are analytical ability, general erudition and experience, and knowledge of the enemy. Although formal or official terminology of reflexive control did not exist in the past, opposing sides actually used it intuitively when they attempted to identify and confront each other’s thoughts, as well as to plan and alter impressions about themselves, thereby inducing erroneous decisions” [5, p. 30].
Successful reflexive control of an adversary allows influence over his military plans, perception of the situation, and actions. In other words, one side can impose its will on the enemy and force him to make a decision inconsistent with the actual situation. Various methods of reflexive control are employed, including camouflage (at all levels), disinformation, provocation, blackmail, and the compromising of officials and commanders. Thus, reflexive control focuses more on the less tangible subjective element of the art of war than on the more objective science of war. Achieving successful reflexive control requires in-depth study of the enemy’s “inner nature”—his ideas and concepts—which Leonenko described as a “filter” through which all information about the external world passes. In this sense, successful reflexive control represents the culmination point of an information operation.
Major General M. D. Ionov, with whom I was personally acquainted, served in the 1970s as head of a department at the Air Defense Academy. He was a profound military theorist who authored several articles on reflexive control. At first, no one was inclined to listen to him. Since the term “reflexive control” did not appear in any Soviet military encyclopedia, it was assumed not to exist. Therefore, in his early writings, Ionov referred to “control of the enemy” rather than reflexive control.
Ionov demonstrated the necessity of combining reflexive methods in order to organize reflexive control [6, pp. 44–45]. He formulated four primary methods of transmitting information to the enemy to facilitate control over him. These methods served as a checklist for decision-making commanders at all levels: the exertion of power pressure, including the use of superior force, shows of force, psychological attacks, ultimatums, threats of sanctions, and risk-based threats (manifested in focusing attention on irrational leadership behavior or delegating authority to irresponsible individuals); military reconnaissance, provocative maneuvers, weapons testing, restricting enemy access or isolating certain areas, increasing combat readiness, coalition building, formal declarations of war; support for destabilizing internal forces in enemy territory, organization of limited strikes, disabling specific military units, “hype” and promotion of victories, demonstrations of ruthless actions, or displays of mercy toward an ally of the enemy who has ceased resistance [ibid., pp. 46–47].
He also described techniques for presenting false information about the situation, including camouflage (showing weakness in a strong position), construction of false facilities (demonstrating “strength” in a weak position), abandoning one position to reinforce another, concealing true interrelations between units or creating false ones, maintaining secrecy of new weapons, bluffing about weaponry, changing methods of operations, or the deliberate loss of important documents. Additional measures included provoking the enemy into seeking new directions of escalation or de-escalation: deliberate demonstration of specific chains of actions, striking an enemy stronghold when it is unoccupied, subversive activities and provocations, leaving open routes for the enemy’s withdrawal, or compelling the enemy to engage in punitive actions that lead to the depletion of his forces, resources, and time.
Influence on the adversary’s decision-making algorithm included systematic war games through which typical plans are perceived, publication of deliberately distorted doctrines, influence on command elements and key figures through transmission of false situational data, reserve-mode actions, and operations aimed at neutralizing the enemy’s operational thinking. Alteration of the timing of decision-making could be achieved through unexpected initiation of hostilities or the transfer of information about analogous conflicts—leading the enemy to act on what seems feasible and predictable, but ultimately forcing him into ill-considered decisions that alter the method and character of his operations. According to Ionov, human targets for reflexive control—whether individuals or groups—must be assessed with regard to their psychology, modes of thinking, and professional training levels.
In another article, Ionov stressed the necessity of obtaining information on the state of the adversary’s armed forces, the nature of their actions, and their command capabilities, while simultaneously halting or delaying his counter-control [7, pp. 29–30]. He outlined several clear principles required for “controlling the enemy”:
The reflexive character of the desired reaction, emphasizing that commanders must clearly understand the possible enemy reaction to conditions they seek to impose;
The problematic nature of the reaction, since the enemy may detect such activity and undertake his own counter-control measures;
The growing level of technological development of weapons, particularly reconnaissance, which makes it increasingly likely that actions aimed at disinforming the enemy will be exposed.
Colonel S. A. Komov, a prominent military theorist regarded by American experts as the most prolific author on information warfare in the 1990s, also wrote extensively on the informational impact of reflexive control. In the journal Military Thought, Komov endorsed Ionov’s emphasis on reflexive control, giving it a different name—“intellectual methods of information warfare.” He listed the main elements of the “intellectual” approach to information warfare, which he described as [8, pp. 18–22]:
distraction (creating a real or imaginary threat to one of the enemy’s vital positions—flanks, rear, etc.—during the preparatory stage of operations, thus forcing him to revise the logic of his decisions);
overload (sending large volumes of contradictory information to the enemy on a frequent basis);
paralysis (creating perceptions of special threats to vital interests or most vulnerable points);
exhaustion (compelling the enemy to carry out useless actions, thereby depleting his military resources);
deception (provoking the enemy to redeploy forces toward a threatened region during preparatory stages of military operations);
division (convincing the enemy to act contrary to coalition interests);
pacification (leading the enemy to believe that ongoing activities are merely training for preplanned operations rather than preparations for offensive action, thus reducing vigilance);
intimidation (creating perceptions of insurmountable superiority);
provocation (inducing the enemy to undertake actions beneficial to one’s own side);
suggestion (presenting information that compromises the enemy legally, morally, ideologically, or in other ways);
pressure (providing information that discredits the government in the eyes of its population).
Captain First Rank F. Chausov further developed the discussion of reflexive control, which he defined as the deliberate transmission of specific information to the opposing side that influences its decision-making in accordance with the transmitted data [9, p. 12]. Chausov formulated the following principles of reflexive control:
a goal-oriented process requiring a complete set of reflexive control methods;
“actualization” of plans, ensured by a sufficiently comprehensive understanding of the intellectual potential of commanders and support staff (based on their real capabilities), particularly under conditions shaped by the global information environment;
consistency of goals, missions, place, time, and methods of reflexive control;
modeling or forecasting the adversary’s state during the execution of actions;
anticipation of events.
A striking example of successful and comprehensive use of reflexive control techniques during the Second World War is provided by A. I. Voevodin [10]. One of the most successful and significant special operations of the war was an operation of the British Admiralty Intelligence Division, codenamed Mincemeat. In this operation, the stratagem “to make the false true, and the true false” was realized.
The Allies needed to seize Sicily. As long as Sicily remained under German control, they dominated the entire Mediterranean, and without capturing it, operations in Italy were impossible. The challenge was to make the Germans believe that the Allies’ first objective would not be Sicily, but another target. The solution was disinformation—ensuring that documents revealing Allied plans would fall into German hands.
The deception involved planting a body at sea carrying a letter. The corpse, purportedly that of a staff officer traveling by plane from England to Africa, had supposedly perished when his aircraft was shot down and had drowned in a life vest. The letter indicated that preparations for an assault on Sicily were a diversion.
Elaborate preparations were made: a pathologist was consulted about what signs a body would bear if killed in an air crash and then immersed in water. A real corpse was obtained, and with family consent, used for the deception. It was dressed in a naval uniform with carefully prepared personal effects—identity documents, love letters, a photograph of a fiancée, bills, ticket stubs, and even an overdraft notice from a bank—creating the identity of Major William Martin.
On April 19, 1943, the submarine Seraph carried the body to its drop-off point. The corpse, with a briefcase attached by a chain and dressed in a life vest, was released into the sea. The Germans found the body, examined it, and passed the documents to intelligence services. Convinced of their authenticity, German intelligence confirmed the false plans.
Hitler himself refused to believe Mussolini’s assertion that the Allies would attack Sicily. Instead, persuaded by the deceptive documents, he concluded the real target would be Sardinia and the Peloponnese. Even two weeks after Allied landings in Sicily, Hitler persisted in believing the operation a feint and dispatched Rommel to command forces in Greece.
As a result, the Germans concentrated their forces in Greece, reinforced defenses, laid minefields, and transferred a tank division there. Significant resources were moved from Sicily to Sardinia and Corsica. When it finally became clear that Sicily was the true target, it was too late to correct the error.
The techniques of reflexive control have earned a worthy place in the history of military art. Under the name “stratagem,” they already appear in the world’s oldest manual on military affairs — Sun Wu’s (Sun Tzu’s) Art of War, a contemporary of Confucius (551–479 BCE), directly in the title of the first chapter: “Warfare is the Way of Deception.” In this chapter, the art of war is defined as the art of deception.
In the third chapter, which the English sinologist Lionel Giles translates as “Attack by Stratagem”, it is proclaimed: “The highest form of generalship is to defeat the enemy without fighting.” For Sun Tzu, victory in battle ranks only third in the hierarchy of martial skill. Second place he assigns to victory through diplomacy, while the highest level belongs to victory achieved through stratagem.
In the 1970s, two sinologists — the Swiss Harro von Senger and the Russian Vladimir Myasnikov — independently “introduced” stratagems to Western culture. The first Russian-language book on stratagems was Myasnikov’s translation of von Senger’s Stratagems: On the Chinese Art of Living and Surviving. As von Senger explains, a stratagem (from Ancient Greek στρατάγηµα — “military trick”) is an algorithm of behavior: a calculated sequence of actions aimed at achieving a hidden goal or solving a problem, with due consideration for the psychology of the target, its position, circumstances, and other features of the situation. This concept has existed in Chinese culture for at least three thousand years. Other meanings include “calculation,” “plan,” “method,” “technique,” or “ruse.”
As an illustration, let us focus, following von Senger, on Stratagem 13 — the stratagem of provocation:
13. Beat the grass to startle the snake.
Objective: reconnaissance by battle, carrying out something seemingly pointless (“beating the grass”) to provoke a response from the enemy (“startling the snake”). The provocation is meant to force the target to reveal its location, plans, strategy, and other information — or to incite it to certain actions or, conversely, to inaction.
This stratagem has a broad range of applications, both military and social. A provocation is, essentially, the creation of a conflict situation (“an action”) in order to obtain some kind of response — often excessive and therefore careless. Such a “reaction” might include threats, accusations, unjustified demands, rudeness, arrogance, outbursts of anger, indifference, disdain, dissatisfaction, contradictory or vague statements, ambiguous hints, and any other actions, and so on. Strange, unusual, or unexpected actions can also prove effective.
Properly executed, a provocation usually elicits from the target statements or actions that it would have been wiser to withhold. An overconfident or poorly conducted provocation, however, may lead to greater caution and secrecy, or even an attempt to stage a false “reaction” — that is, to feed disinformation. An alternative name for this stratagem is the “annoy the general” ruse, or the stratagem of “goading the commander.” Successful implementation requires good psychological knowledge, a degree of theatrical skill, a sense of proportion, and justified confidence that the target does not realize what is really happening.
The collection of thirty-six stratagems grew out of China’s vast military tradition. Over thousands of years, the accumulated experience of wars and conflicts was analyzed and systematized, leading to the creation of various treatises, collections of patterns, rules, and methods of warfare. As Myasnikov emphasizes [11], before the advent of Christianity and, later, chivalry, the peoples of Western Europe, like the Chinese, seldom considered the moral aspect of warfare toward the enemy as a meaningful element of strategy. The often-romanticized knightly tradition, in practice, amounted to occasional displays of magnanimity by the stronger side toward the weaker. In Eastern Europe, particularly Byzantium, military cunning was a common and widely accepted practice. A hadith attributed to the Prophet Muhammad, echoing Sun Tzu, likewise declares: “War is deception.” Thus, both world experience and Chinese practice indicate that stratagems are an inseparable part of warfare. Ultimately, the main purpose of war is to achieve results.
For the Chinese, military deception was seen primarily as a means of avoiding heavy human and material losses. The successful application of a ruse was considered an unquestionable benefit to the people and the state, while a talented strategist-general had every reason and sanction to employ any cunning necessary for victory. The acute shortage of land and other resources, hostile surroundings, constant wars, natural disasters, a complex social hierarchy in a densely populated country with a collectivist model of society, and the daily necessity of survival over millennia all shaped a worldview in which life was seen as war and war as a model of life. As Myasnikov notes, although living conditions in modern China have improved significantly, stratagem-thinking remains an important part of social relations, since concerns with personal success and prosperity occupy people’s minds no less than survival once did for their distant ancestors.
The Chinese attitude toward cunning and deception in interpersonal communication is not equivalent to moral relativism or permissiveness. The use of stratagem tactics for base or dishonorable ends was condemned by Confucian scholars even in ancient times. Over five millennia of history, Chinese culture developed a reliable set of social rituals, ethical norms, and mechanisms to counter antisocial behavior. Moreover, stratagems themselves function as one of these regulating tools.
A good illustration of the positive, traditionally Chinese view of stratagem use in the social context is the concept of “face” and the necessity of constantly “saving” it. Authors of Chinese works on stratagems often refer to this aspect of ruse application. In communication, situations often arise in which something must be done that inevitably touches upon the interests or sense of dignity of another person — something that, in cultural terms, is almost always seen negatively. Stratagems help, for example, to convey necessary criticism to a teacher, client, business partner, or superior in a way that serves the common good, or to adjust their behavior in the desired direction — without hurting dignity or lowering status. Thus, the Chinese often employ such a “white lie” for the sake of preserving outward “decorum.” To those raised with Western values, this may sometimes seem like outright deceit that impedes progress.
Many researchers note that the most important elements of the Chinese approach to strategy — in contrast to much of the Western approach — are the principles of indirect action, nonviolence, and conflict avoidance. Every effort is made to resolve situations peacefully and to create mutual benefit, even when one side technically ends up the loser.
The very first specialist in reflexive control in history was, it seems, the biblical serpent. He was the one who asked the woman: “Did God really say, ‘You shall not eat from any tree in the garden’?” (In fact, God had said: “You must not eat fruit from the tree that is in the middle of the garden, and you must not touch it, or you will die” — The Bible. Canonical Books of the Old and New Testaments, p. 3. — Author’s note). But the serpent told the woman: “You will not surely die.” And the woman saw that the tree was good for food, pleasant to the eyes, and desirable for gaining wisdom. She took its fruit and ate it, and also gave some to her husband. The consequences are well known: God cursed the serpent, promised the woman pain in childbirth, and told the man he would earn his bread by the sweat of his brow (Genesis, chapter 3:16, 19). Unfortunately, Eve was ready to be provoked.
Other heroes had to be persuaded. Brother Rabbit, for example, made successful use of reflexive control when he pleaded with Brother Fox: “Do anything you want with me, just don’t throw me into the briar patch.” Of course, that is exactly what saved him — he escaped into the briar patch.
But tragic outcomes are also common. Iago, hating both Othello and Cassio, plants Desdemona’s handkerchief on Cassio in order to arouse Othello’s uncontrollable jealousy. When the naïve Cassio innocently shows Desdemona’s handkerchief, Othello takes it as proof of infidelity, strangles Desdemona, and then, realizing his mistake, takes his own life.
Even in children’s literature, we find such examples. Victim of provocation Karlsson-on-the-Roof managed to entrap Freken Bok with the classic catch-question: “Have you stopped drinking cognac in the mornings? Yes or no?”
Victims of reflexive control appear not only on the pages of famous works but also in everyday life — for instance, the “freebie seekers” crowding around rigged street games. The situation of endlessly raising stakes is a domestic example of reflexive control.
As both Chinese stratagems and the lives of literary characters demonstrate, manipulative technologies are most often based on lies and deception, on the desire to leave the other side “fooled.” Inevitably, the question arises of how to give a moral evaluation to this or that form of manipulative influence.
Perhaps one of V. Lefebvre’s main achievements was that he was the first to draw attention to the need to describe the moral dimension of the human being in precise scientific terms, while at the same time rejecting the notion of the human as a purely rational (pragmatic) creature. He developed a concept of moral consciousness that incorporates into situational assessment an evaluative mechanism of “good versus evil.” It is precisely through this mechanism that psychological phenomena arise—phenomena we recognize as guilt, compassion, condemnation, and the like—and thus also the essential sources of internal motivation for human actions [12, pp. 56–58].
The question of whether one may deceive others for the sake of achieving a specific result and still remain, in one’s own eyes and in the eyes of society, a moral person is far from simple. The issue of how the space of free moral choice develops in children of different ages is discussed in [13]. Whether or not we accept the authors’ conclusion—that in children the application of social intelligence in the form of deceiving an adult constitutes a necessary prerequisite for the emergence of free moral choice and the subsequent development of internal moral motivation—still requires careful consideration. However, the conclusion that in adults the use of social intelligence in the form of deception and manipulation does not contradict morality, provided that such use aims at the good of others and is directed against evil, remains debatable. Such formulations appear deliberately abstract. Resolving such moral dilemmas, it seems, requires a more subtle differentiation of initial premises—namely, of different ethical systems (in Lefebvre’s terms).
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Auteur Georgy Smolyan